

Cambridge International AS & A Level

HISTORY 9489/33

Paper 3 Interpretations Question

May/June 2022

1 hour 15 minutes

You must answer on the enclosed answer booklet.

You will need: Answer booklet (enclosed)

INSTRUCTIONS

Answer one question from one section only.

Section A: The origins of the First World War

Section B: The Holocaust

Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War

• Follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

INFORMATION

- The total mark for this paper is 40.
- The number of marks for each question or part question is shown in brackets [].



Answer **one** question from **one** section only.

Section A: Topic 1

The origins of the First World War

1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

War seemed absurd, but it happened nonetheless, and events even showed some logic – as well as chaos, incompetence and blindness.

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Thus the alliances, instead of preserving peace,

made war almost inevitable.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the origins of the First World War to explain your answer. [40]

Section B: Topic 2

The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

Nazi genocide did not take place in a vacuum. Genocide was only the most radical method of excluding groups of human beings from the German national community. The policy of exclusion drew upon and followed more than fifty years of scientific opposition to the equality of man. Since the turn of the century, the German elite – that is, the members of the educated professional classes – had increasingly accepted an ideology of human inequality. Scientists advanced a theory of human heredity that merged with the racist doctrine of ultra-nationalists to form a political ideology based on race. The Nazi movement both absorbed and advanced this ideology. After coming to power in 1933, the Nazis created the political framework that made it possible to translate this ideology of inequality into a policy of exclusion. At the same time, the German bureaucratic, professional and scientific elite provided the legitimacy the regime needed for the smooth implementation of this policy.

As the Nazi regime moved towards war, Hitler authorised state and party planners to proceed from the exclusion policies of emigration, incarceration and sterilisation to the most radical exclusion solution of killings. The first group targeted were the handicapped, in the so-called euthanasia programme. In 1940 and early 1941, when the radical killing solution was already being applied to the handicapped, the policy towards Jews did not yet include killings. At that time, limited emigration, ghettoisation, and schemes calling for the establishment of Jewish reservations remained the only exclusion policy options for Jews. But when international conditions and the progress of the war made a more radical solution possible, the killings were expanded to include Jews. The much smaller group of Roma was also not at first a target of the killing solution. Roma were initially subjected to persecution by the police, who imprisoned them as criminals. Then they were studied and sterilised by race scientists, in a close collaboration between the police and health authorities. Eventually, after they had been classified as racially inferior, they were killed alongside Jews.

The killing operations that commenced with the start of the Second World War were the result of old beliefs and recent policies. Although the Nazi policies of exclusion, including compulsory sterilisation, were crucial steps toward the implementation of the killings, old beliefs that predated Hitler's assumption of power were equally essential. As early as 1920, prominent scientists had called for the 'destruction of the unworthy of life'. The Nazi regime merely put their proposal into practice. The euthanasia killings – that is, the systematic and secret execution of the handicapped - were the Nazis' first organised mass murder, in which the perpetrators developed their killing techniques. They created the method for selecting the victims. They invented techniques to gas people and burn their bodies. They employed deception to hide the killings, and they did not hesitate to rob the corpses. The euthanasia killings proved to be the opening act of Nazi genocide. The mass murder of the handicapped preceded that of the Jews and Roma. The Final Solution followed euthanasia. In euthanasia, the perpetrators faced popular disapproval, so the killings were transferred from Germany to the East. No essential difference existed, however, between the killing operations directed against the handicapped, Jews and Roma. The killing technique that had been developed and tested in euthanasia was used again and again. The killers who learned their trade in euthanasia killing centres also staffed the killing centres at Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

Section C: Topic 3

The origins and development of the Cold War

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

Stalin assumed that the other Great Powers would remain selfish, scheming and quarrelsome, in accordance with the Leninist concept of imperialism. When Stalin assessed his Western opponents, he did it on his notion of their 'imperialist' nature and logic. When the Labour government in London did not show consistency in this regard, Stalin mocked them. Bevin and Attlee, he said in November 1945, 'are great fools: they have the power in a great country and they don't know what to do with it'. Ideological differences explained Stalin's expansionism and his belief that the Soviet Union could get away with it. In particular, his expectation of an inevitable post-war economic crisis, and his belief in 'imperialist contradictions' among capitalist states, made him dismiss the possibility of Western cooperation. Also, Stalin's expansionism was linked to his domestic policies, which included Russo-centric propaganda and his appeal to other forms of nationalism. Nationalist sentiments and aspirations amongst Soviet elites and the broader public gave domestic support for the Kremlin's policies of 'socialist imperialism' in 1945–46.

It is not possible to determine whether Stalin expected that his toughness in the Balkans and his interfering in Iran and Turkey would provoke a rupture with his Western allies. It is clear, though, that Stalin's actions helped to pave the way for the Cold War. His tactics in the Middle East helped to bring about a post-war cooperation between Great Britain and the United States, and made US administrations react harshly to 'Soviet expansionism'. Stalin's assumptions played a trick on him. He was brutally effective where his territorial and political goals could be supported by the force of the Soviet army. However, as for diplomacy and public relations, his stance was disastrous. Without adequate feedback about his own failures, he persevered in the course that helped to turn the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States into a full-scale confrontation. And, later, his black-and-white world view, faith in brute force, and Marxist-Leninist ideological baggage, left him without any alternative to the Cold War and the mobilisation of Soviet economic and military power.

Stalin's mind was closed to the motives behind American global interventionism. Stalin could foresee the end of American isolationism, but he failed to understand the appeal of the multilateralist ideas which drove the United States to stay involved in Europe. Until the autumn of 1945, Stalin received many benefits from his partnership with Washington. His experience dealing with Americans led him to believe that he could achieve other marginal gains without encountering US resistance, so long as Soviet actions targeted the British spheres of influence. Much to Stalin's surprise, the Truman administration decided that there was no alternative to containment of Soviet expansionism in every part of the world, including Central Europe. This decision set the stage for decades of Cold War.

Stalin did avoid one huge mistake. He never openly posed as an aggressor and carefully preserved the pretence of international legitimacy on his expansionism. The Soviet leader left to the West the role of breaking the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam and starting a confrontation. Later Molotov could claim: 'What does the 'Cold War' mean? We were simply making gains. They became angry at us, of course, but we had to consolidate what we had conquered.' The majority of Soviet citizens shared this perception. For decades to come, they would continue to believe that not Stalin but the United States had unleashed the Cold War.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

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