



Cambridge Pre-U

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

9774/02

Paper 2 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 1

May/June 2022

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 50

Published

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

Cambridge International will not enter into discussions about these mark schemes.

Cambridge International is publishing the mark schemes for the May/June 2022 series for most Cambridge IGCSE, Cambridge International A and AS Level and Cambridge Pre-U components, and some Cambridge O Level components.

Generic Marking Principles

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:

Rules must be applied consistently, e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

Assessment objectives (AOs)

AO1	Demonstrate knowledge and understanding; identify, select and apply ideas and concepts through the use of examples and evidence.	40%
AO2	Provide a systematic critical analysis of the texts and theories, sustain a line of argument and justify a point of view. Different views should be referred to and evaluated where appropriate. Demonstrate a synoptic approach to the areas studied.	60%

In the textual questions AO1 and AO2 are assessed separately.

AO1 and AO2 are both to be considered in assessing each essay.

The **Generic Marking Scheme** should be used to decide the mark. The essay should first be placed within a level which best describes its qualities, and then at a specific point within that level to determine a mark out of 25.

The **Question-Specific Notes** provide guidance for Examiners as to the area covered by the question. These question-specific notes are not exhaustive. Candidates may answer the question from a variety of angles with different emphases and using different supporting evidence and knowledge for which they receive credit according to the Generic Marking Scheme levels. However, candidates must clearly answer the question as set and not their own question. Examiners are reminded that the insights of specific religious traditions are, of course, relevant, and it is likely that candidates will draw on the views of Jewish, Christian or Islamic theologians, as well as those of philosophers who have written about the concept of God from a purely philosophical standpoint. There is nothing to prevent candidates referring to other religious traditions and these must, of course, be credited appropriately in examination responses.

Table A: Generic Marking Scheme for 10 mark questions

Level 5 9–10 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 7–8 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 5–6 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Reasonable attempt to use supporting evidence. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 3–4 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–2 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relevant material to credit.

Table B: Generic Marking Scheme for 15 mark questions

Level 5 13–15 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 10–12 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 7–9 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 4–6 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–3 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relevant material to credit.

Table C: Generic Marking Scheme for 25 mark questions

<p>Level 5</p> <p>21–25 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
<p>Level 4</p> <p>16–20 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
<p>Level 3</p> <p>12–15 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
<p>Level 2</p> <p>8–11 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.

Level 1 1–7 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short.• Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic.• Argument is limited or confused.• Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question.• Limited attempt to use evidence.• Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• No relevant material to credit.

Question	Answer	Marks
1(a)	<p>With reference to the passage, explain Russell’s account of the difference between general propositions known <i>a priori</i> and empirical generalisations.</p> <p>The difference does not consist in the view that general propositions known <i>a priori</i> cannot provide new knowledge. Russell has previously claimed that ‘nothing can be known to exist <i>a priori</i>’ and, consequently, in the example given in the passage experience is required to inform us of the existence of two people called Brown and Jones, and another two people called Robinson and Smith. Hence, if we already know that $2 + 2 = 4$, we can deduce that these two couples make four people. However, ‘the stock instance’ of deduction – all men are mortal; Socrates is a man, etc. – does not obviously provide any new knowledge.</p> <p>Russell argues that, in this case, what we know from experience is that certain men have been mortal and, if Socrates was one of them, it is not necessary to employ the stages of a deductive argument to demonstrate the <i>probability</i> of Socrates’ mortality. If Socrates is not one of the men, Russell claims that the probability that Socrates is mortal is still greater on inductive grounds than the probability that all men are mortal. If Socrates is mortal, it does not follow that all men are mortal. The difference between general propositions known <i>a priori</i> (such as $2 + 2 = 4$) and empirical generalisations (such as ‘all men are mortal’) is that deductive argumentation is characteristic of the former, whereas induction is theoretically preferable in the latter. Whereas any empirical generalisation is less certain than the instances that support it, general principles known <i>a priori</i> do not need an inference from instances and possess a certainty not increased by fresh instances.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
1(b)	<p>Critically examine Russell’s treatment of the problem of induction.</p> <p>Although this is a text-based question, some answers may begin by outlining the classic formulation of the problem of induction via a reference to Hume. For example, ‘if there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion’. Clearly, given that Russell provides his own outline of the problem, this is by no means necessary.</p> <p>Russell begins by noting that, in order to extend our knowledge, we must know general principles that enable us to make inferences. Our conviction that the sun will rise tomorrow follows from our experience of the sun rising in the past. The only reason for supposing that laws of motion will remain in operation is that they have operated in the past. Does this provide evidence that they will continue to operate in the future? His view is that we cannot prove that they will but we can provide reasonable grounds for supposing that it is likely that they will. Despite the chicken that expects to be fed, but has its neck wrung, past uniformities cause expectations.</p> <p>Russell argues that belief in the uniformity of nature is a belief in ‘some general law’ that has no exceptions. Science is the paradigm case of inductive reasoning and it is the business of science to find uniformities such as the laws of motion. With regard to the <i>principle of induction</i> he argues that the greater number of cases in which ‘A’ has been found to be associated with ‘B’, if no cases of a failure of association are known, the more probable it is that ‘A’ is always associated with ‘B’. A sufficient number of cases will make it nearly certain that ‘A’ is always associated with ‘B’. Consequently, the general law, while not reaching certainty, approaches certainty without limit and such probability is all we should seek.</p> <p>He uses the example of the discovery of black swans to counter the claim that probably ‘all swans are white’, but argues that in a given case or class of cases the inference that ‘the next swan I see will be white’ survives this. Experience can neither prove nor disprove the <i>principle of induction</i>.</p> <p>Consequently, Russell appears to offer an <i>a priori</i> acceptance of the inductive principle, without which we cannot justify any expectations about future events nor any general principles of science. Rather, we need to accept inductive argumentation as an example of strong reasoning from which conclusions follow rationally (if only as probabilities that approach certainty without reaching it).</p> <p>Evaluation may be positive, for example that it is ‘natural’, or that we have a natural inclination, to accept the inductive principle. However, while Russell maintained his view (it appears 30 years later in his ‘History of Western Philosophy’) few others have held it. If <i>a priori</i> knowledge is analytic, Russell’s argument that it is likely that the next A will also be B is not a typical conceptualisation of analyticity. Some may claim that we should not expect inductive argumentation to meet the standards applying to deductive arguments and/or that it is simply pragmatic to accept the inductive principle.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
1(b)	<p>More critically, expectations that the next A will also be B depends on what A and B are (i.e. whether this represents a regularity we expect to persist or one that we do not expect to persist). Some answers may refer to Goodman's emeralds.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
2	<p>Evaluate idealism.</p> <p>Idealism is the view that reality is mind-correlative: reality, as we understand it, reflects the workings of mind(s).</p> <p>Answers are likely to focus substantially on Berkeley's strong epistemic idealism – to be is to be perceived – although weaker versions such as the claim that to be is to be perceivable may also be referred to. References may be made to Berkeley's 'master argument' and whether it succeeds. Alternative accounts of idealism, such as ontological versions claiming that everything there is arises from, or supervenes upon, the operations of mind as well as explanatory or conceptual versions of idealism may also feature. It should be clear that it is not the existence but the nature of reality with which idealism is concerned. (Generally, there is a rejection of materialism, although some versions of idealism are compatible with materialism.)</p> <p>A range of well-known objections to idealism are likely to feature such as Johnson's 'I refute it thus' and Moore's hands. Kant's refutation of epistemological idealism may also appear but, arguably, all this shows is that minds have to assume the existence of physical objects.</p> <p>Other more substantial difficulties have included problems in accounting for perceptual errors, typically addressed via references to the regularity of experience. What happens to objects when they are not being perceived (a range of illustrative examples refer to this, e.g. trees falling in forests, leaving a bath running, fires gradually burning down, etc.) has no impact on Berkeley due to the role God plays in explaining the order and regularity of experience. The threat of solipsism may be the most difficult.</p> <p>As always, candidates are free to argue and develop their own position on idealism: some may insist that any characterisation of reality we can develop is bound to be mind-constructed; others may claim that an inference to the best explanation is that material objects cause our perceptual experiences.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
3	<p>‘A belief is justified if it coheres with other beliefs in an individual’s belief system.’ Critically examine this view.</p> <p>Coherentism may initially be presented as a response to difficulties associated with foundationalism, a base-superstructure model of justification that, according to some, is bound to fail whether based on what is directly given in experience (empiricist foundationalism) or on supposedly self-evident propositions (rationalist foundationalism). The ‘myth of the given’ has been employed to attack the former; with regard to the latter, the alleged infallibility of a supposedly self-evident proposition has been attacked.</p> <p>Some may see coherentism as a response to the Agrippan trilemma. Coherentism advances the view that my belief, ‘x’, is justified if my understanding of the (social or natural) world is more coherent with ‘x’ than it is without ‘x’. That is, a belief is justified if it has a coherent place in a system or network of beliefs. Justification, on this account, is not all or nothing: there are no special foundational beliefs. Rather, supporters of coherence typically view the network of beliefs as a web of interlocking beliefs. At the centre of the web are strongly supported beliefs; these are less likely to be revised if new beliefs are acquired than less well supported beliefs on the fringes of the network.</p> <p>There are both positive and negative approaches to justification: positively, a belief supports other beliefs in the web; negatively, a belief should not contradict other beliefs in the web. There are also ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions of coherence theories: in the strong version, coherence is the sole determinant of the justification of a belief; in weaker versions coherence is one determinant of justification.</p> <p>The question does not require candidates to address knowledge but some may do so. If so, knowledge is true belief, plus justification via coherence, plus indefeasibility.</p> <p>It is likely that many candidates will provide one or more illustrations of how coherence operates. Beliefs concerning Aunt Dotty and/or Father Christmas may feature and some candidates may construct their own examples.</p> <p>Evaluation may be positive. Arguably, the focus on coherence is more pragmatic than foundationalism. Coherence serves as a test of the beliefs that we already have and as a method of revising or retaining them. Equally, evaluation may be negative. If justification is a matter concerning the internal coherence of a belief set, there may be only a limited correspondence to any external reality. What is justified is each belief in a web of beliefs, not the web itself. Different belief-sets may be held, all of which might be internally coherent. Complete fictions cohere.</p> <p>Two contrasting perspectives may be equally coherent. Beliefs are acquired in isolation, not as a set. Coherentism cannot explain how we acquire belief <i>sets</i> in the first place, since they are acquired in isolation and not in sets.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
4(a)	<p>With reference to the passage, explain Ayer’s view of the proper relationship between philosophy and science.</p> <p>Ayer draws a distinction between the mature sciences (e.g. physics) and less advanced sciences (e.g. psychology). The former have benefitted from clear, definitive analyses of concepts while the latter have not freed themselves from metaphysics and continue to employ poorly defined symbols (such as ‘sub-conscious self’, etc.). He claims that science is blind without philosophy – and that philosophy is ‘virtually empty’ without science – so that the role of philosophy is to become the logic of science by clearly defining the symbols that the sciences employ. Only by doing so will philosophy contribute to the growth of human knowledge.</p> <p>Beyond this, some may refer to Ayer’s remarks, earlier in the text, concerning a conception of philosophy as ‘the study of reality as a whole’, which is vague, metaphysical and sometimes taken as being different from the reality investigated by the physical sciences. Philosophy is not an addition to the existing sciences as ‘a special department of speculative knowledge’ studying what is beyond the scope of the empirical sciences. In order to preserve the unity of philosophy with science it is necessary to rid philosophy of speculative metaphysics, including searching for religious and ethical knowledge, and concentrate purely on defining the symbols that particular sciences employ.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
4(b)	<p>Evaluate Ayer’s claim that all utterances about the nature of God are nonsensical.</p> <p>Some will note that Ayer has already rejected the possibility of religious knowledge given his approach to metaphysics in the opening chapter in which he claims that all metaphysical sentences are nonsensical. He argues that in order for philosophy to stand as a genuine branch of knowledge, it must distinguish itself from metaphysics.</p> <p>His view is that we cannot demonstratively prove that God exists: all empirical propositions are no more than probable and all <i>a priori</i> propositions are empty tautologies. Indeed, we cannot even show that it is probable that God exists. Appealing to regularity in nature is pointless because (according to Ayer) no religious believer would accept that what they mean by ‘God exists’ is that there is regularity in nature.</p> <p>So, ‘God exists’ is a nonsensical metaphysical utterance (as are the utterances, in relation to God, of atheists and agnostics). Ayer argues that the theist claims nothing: theistic (and atheistic) assertions are neither valid nor invalid. The idea of a supra-person whose essential attributes are non-empirical is unintelligible. ‘God’ is not a genuine name. Consequently, if God surpasses human understanding, this is because the concept of God is unintelligible.</p> <p>Ayer dismisses faith as a basis for belief because faith is not genuinely cognitive. Similarly, religious experience does not show that there is religious knowledge, and belief based on intuition simply provides material for psychoanalysts.</p> <p>Obviously, candidates may draw from a wide range of material when evaluating Ayer’s view. His view that science removes one motivation for religious belief – feelings of awe – together with his rather glib dismissal of physicists sympathetic to religion (due to a lack of confidence in their own hypotheses) can be challenged by references to more recent work. The verification principle has implications not only for the philosophy of religion but also ethics, aesthetics, issues in political philosophy, etc., and debates in these areas do not seem to be vacuous or meaningless.</p> <p>However, alternative approaches to religious language are most likely to feature. For example, religious claims are verifiable eschatologically. Those sympathetic to Ayer may nevertheless argue that falsification is more in keeping with scientific method.</p> <p>Those critical of Ayer’s approach may refer to ‘bliks’, language games, a commitment to live in accordance with a certain morality, etc., in arguing that religious claims are meaningful to individuals and communities.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
5	<p>‘The term “good” refers to a simple, unanalysable and non-natural property which cannot be identified with any natural property.’ Evaluate ethical non-naturalism.</p> <p>Some will identify ethical non-naturalism as a cognitivist theory and many will identify it in contrast to ethical naturalism – the view that moral terms are definable in non-moral, natural terms.</p> <p>Ethical non-naturalism has a long history, so there may be references to Reid, Sidgwick or Price but it is likely that arguments from early 20th century philosophers, e.g. Moore, Prichard and Ross, will feature strongly. The core features of ethical non-naturalism, or intuitionism, are that moral principles are knowable, intuitively self-evident and grasped via a kind of sixth sense (either God-given in some early writings or a particular rational faculty). There is a moral reality, so moral beliefs may be true or false. Moral goods are not reducible to some natural property. Intuitionists are moral realists and non-naturalists; some lean towards utilitarianism and some to deontology.</p> <p>Moore held that ‘good’ is an indefinable something – good is a word like yellow, not defined in terms of anything else – the ‘open-question’ argument may be employed to illustrate his rejection of naturalism. Just as we know yellow when we see it, so too the good is self-evident and grasped intuitively. Unlike Moore, who is generally linked to ideal utilitarianism, both Prichard and Ross held deontological views linking morality to what is ‘right’ rather than what is ‘good’ and to intentions rather than consequences. What is intuitive is a sense of obligation: noticing a feature of a situation self-evidently makes a difference to the way we feel we should behave.</p> <p>Objections levelled at intuitionism include claims that Moore, for example, provides an impoverished view of the ‘good’. Comparisons with a faculty of mathematical intuition are unconvincing because moral intuitions may conflict. The issue of why, without an appropriate desire, the intuitive belief that an action is morally wrong would deter anyone from performing it. From a non-cognitive point of view, moral values may be consistent or inconsistent, sincere or insincere, but not correct or mistaken. Moral discussion is characterised by disagreement and notions of a ‘special’ moral faculty – allegedly absent in the ‘morally blind’ who disagree with us – that is mysterious. Some may refer to Mackie’s ‘error theory’.</p> <p>However, moral facts may exist in virtue of, or supervene upon, natural facts without being definable in terms of those facts. Being aware of certain features of a situation may provide reasons for performing or not performing actions. This may be intuitive so that intuition provides an answer to questions concerning how we come to know moral rights and wrongs.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
6	<p>‘The concept of divine simplicity provides a fully coherent understanding of God’s essential nature.’ Critically assess this claim.</p> <p>Many have regarded divine simplicity as foundational to an understanding of God’s nature. The concept is present in all monotheistic religions and in the works of early and medieval theologians. It is the view that absolute perfection requires simplicity.</p> <p>The concept is typically linked to views such as God is eternal; the intrinsic properties of God are essential properties; the attributes of God cannot be distinguished from one another and/or that a discussion of ‘attributes’ is misleading because God is identical with God’s essence. (We may draw conceptual distinctions between attributes, but these all refer to a single entity.)</p> <p>It has been associated with views such as we understand God negatively (as what God is not); God is what God has (Augustine); what we can say truly of God is identical with God’s essence (Anselm) and God is identical with God’s nature (Aquinas). If this approach is coherent, then God cannot lack a perfection and is identical with perfect goodness, power, knowledge, etc. We draw distinctions between such attributes but they all refer to the same entity under different descriptions. The fact that God cannot lack a perfection entails divine simplicity.</p> <p>Obviously, candidates are free to argue either way for whether or not this view is coherent but some critical analysis should be present. For example, could an eternal God act in time? Is the notion of an atemporal life coherent? If God is free to intervene in God’s creation, then presumably God could choose to intervene or choose not to. This looks like an intrinsic but accidental property in which God’s actions differ in different possible worlds. The concept of divine simplicity is difficult to reconcile with that of the Holy Trinity. Most importantly, perhaps, God’s nature appears to be abstract rather than personal.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
7(a)	<p>With reference to the passage, explain Hick’s view that some human suffering must appear to be unmerited, pointless and morally irrational.</p> <p>Prior to the passage, Hick describes the problem of suffering as one that does not appear to serve a constructive purpose: rather, it is often random, undeserved, meaningless and seemingly irrational. Consequently, he rejects accounts that attempt to rationalise suffering, for example in terms of just desert, and appeals instead to mystery.</p> <p>In the passage, he argues that suffering, in a world that contained no unjust, undeserved or excessive suffering, would be regarded as justly deserved or as serving a constructive purpose of moral training. Consequently, it would not evoke deep personal sympathy or generate humanitarian responses. Such compassionate reactions require that suffering is undeserved and bad for the sufferer. Thus, unmerited suffering is necessary in order for people to develop qualities such as compassion and generosity. Therefore, some suffering must be unmerited, pointless and irrational.</p> <p>Beyond the passage, Hick continues to argue that the elimination of unjust suffering and the apportioning of suffering to desert would entail that nobody would do what is right simply because it is right. Some human suffering must appear to be unmerited, pointless and morally irrational because faith demands an element of mystery, otherwise free will and the epistemic gap in relation to God is compromised. Random suffering serves a purpose: if suffering were deserved and rational we would notice and self-interestedly change our ways. In order to preserve an epistemic gap, some suffering must be random and undeserved.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	<p>Evaluate Hick’s account of why God did not create humans that would always freely act rightly.</p> <p>The free will defence (FWD) is a response to the inconsistent triad – God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, evil exists – and concerns moral evil, which according to the FWD results from human free will. In addition, supporters of the FWD regard free will as essential if humanity is to form a genuine relationship with God.</p> <p>Both Flew and Mackie criticise the FWD. Flew argues that God could have created a world in which all humans possessed a good nature. Their free choices would flow from their good nature and they would always choose to act rightly. Similarly, Mackie argues that there is a world in which it is logically possible for an individual to choose to act rightly on one occasion, and logically possible for an individual to act rightly on every occasion. This applies to all individuals. Given such a world is logically possible, and God did not create it, either God is not omnipotent or God is not omnibenevolent.</p> <p>Hick begins by noting that God’s omnipotence does not imply that God can do anything. God cannot do that which is logically absurd, for example make a round square or a four-sided triangle. (‘Not even infinite might can adopt a meaningless form of words as a programme for action.’) Secondly, the creation of persons who are not free to choose wrongly as well as to choose rightly is self-contradictory – moreover, if man is a puppet and God a puppet-master, then man cannot enter into a personal relationship with his Maker.</p> <p>However, the question remains: could God have made men and women that would always freely choose to act rightly? For such persons, it would be logically possible but morally impossible for them to sin. ‘The fact of Christ’ establishes that moral perfection is compatible with a liability to temptation. Consequently, Hick accepts that God could have made persons who are both free to sin and tempted to sin but who remain sinless. This is the core of the Flew-Mackie attack on the FWD.</p> <p>Hick refers to Smarts’ response to the approach of Flew and Mackie, referred to as ‘the utopia thesis’, but while he is sympathetic to the claim that words like ‘goodness’ lose their meaning in a utopia, he acknowledges that it does not defeat the Flew/Mackie account of what was logically possible for God to create. Hick’s response to Flew consists in a preference for a stronger notion of free will – freedom as limited creativity – in which actions proceed from the nature of the agent but in which outcomes are indeterminate.</p> <p>Hick’s response to Mackie’s series of questions concerning what was logically possible for God is to add a question concerning a religious, rather than purely ethical, dimension of the issue. ‘Is it logically possible for God so to make men that they will freely respond to Himself in love and trust and faith?’ Hick’s answer is no. The ‘hypnotist’ example is likely to feature and the claim that ‘a patient is not free in relation to the hypnotist’ illustrates Hick’s view that Mackie’s approach ignores the divine purpose that men and women should freely enter into a filial relationship with God. Hick concludes that it is logically impossible to produce authentic fiduciary attitudes by manipulation.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	<p>Answers sympathetic to Hick (and others, e.g. Swinburne) may argue for this approach as preferable to any alternative theodicy. Via a long evolutionary process, humanity is free to respond or fail to respond to God in uncompelled faith. Moreover, ‘goodness’ only makes sense in relation to evil, and a world in which we struggle to achieve ‘goods’ is preferable to a ‘toy world’. Some may refer to Plantinga’s claim that Curly Smith, for example, would make the wrong choice, a choice that produces suffering, at least once in any possible world that God created (arguably, we all would). Thus, there are possible worlds that God cannot create – a world, for example, in which we are free and in which there is no suffering.</p> <p>Alternatively, others will claim that excessive suffering is neither necessary nor desirable to attain certain ends. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to see how sustained and gratuitous suffering (possibly due to horrendous evils) strengthens souls. Even if it did, arguably the price is too high. Perhaps a world in which our freedom is illusory (although we would not be aware of this) and in which there was less suffering would be preferable. Others will claim simply that the sheer amount of suffering strongly evidences that there is no God.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
8	<p>Evaluate psychological accounts of why religious belief may be compelling.</p> <p>Some psychological accounts of religious belief constitute part of a wider naturalistic approach that tends to view the idea of God as metaphysical and, consequently, problematic to the point of lacking coherence. Generally, the claim is that there are no sound reasons for religious belief and no possibility of establishing the truth of religious claims. Nevertheless, religious belief persists and consequently requires explanation.</p> <p>Freud argued that subconscious processes underpin religious belief. Specifically, the fears we have and helplessness we feel as children are the root of religiosity. As children, we look to our fathers for security and protection. As adults, with the same feelings of helplessness, we conceive of and look to a heavenly father to protect us. God, as exalted heavenly father, is illusory but comforting: an idealised father who protects us from and compensates us for suffering, injustice and uncertainty. Religious belief is a kind of obsessional delusion. On such a view, belief in God is, at best, a way of sparing many people from experiencing individual neuroses. A world that we cannot control leads us to revert to infantile attitudes and create a heavenly father (in monotheisms).</p> <p>Objections to this view include those aimed at Freud's theories of subconscious processes (repressed memories and desires); claims that the approach is not universally applicable (it applies to paternalistic monotheisms) and claims that the approach is unfalsifiable and, therefore, meaningless. Some may refer to 'just so' stories.</p> <p>Nevertheless, Freud has influenced other naturalistic approaches – evolutionary psychology and evolutionary biology – in which belief in God is a (useless) by-product of beliefs and practices that were useful to us as children. Alternatively, some will argue that religious belief belongs to a religious perspective not available to outsiders and/or that naturalism destroys what it seeks to explain. Naturalists insist that some reality is behind religiosity but it is natural rather than metaphysical. Either way, both sides can claim to provide an account of what makes religion compelling. Some may argue more positively, possibly via Jung, and claim either that psychology cannot explain the inclination to religion or that the existence of God is an explanation of such an inclination.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
9	<p>‘Different cosmological arguments for the existence of God are equally unconvincing.’ Critically examine this claim.</p> <p>As one of the classic arguments for the existence of God, this is a relatively straightforward issue for candidates. However, the question is plural – candidates should consider more than one version of the argument – and there is more than one aspect of the question. Firstly, whether or not cosmological arguments are persuasive; secondly, regardless of answers to this first question, whether a given version of the argument is more persuasive or less flawed than other versions.</p> <p>Arguments from Plato and Aristotle may feature, although it is, perhaps, more likely that the first three of Aquinas’ five ways (arguments from motion, causation and contingency) will be the starting point for many. Arguments based on the principle of sufficient reason (e.g. from Leibniz or Clarke) will probably feature. Some may refer to the Kalam cosmological argument, to al-Kindi and/or al-Ghazali as well as to recent exponents of this argument. Descartes’ ‘trademark’ argument could also feature. Clearly, candidates can meet the demands of the question without covering all of the above.</p> <p>Typically, there are two stages to cosmological arguments: firstly, the existence of the universe is contingent and requires an explanation; secondly, that a being in possession of the properties of God, a necessary being, supplies the explanation. However, there are different types of cosmological argument. Some deny an infinite regress of causes (e.g. Aquinas) or claim that an actual infinite regress is impossible (e.g. al Kindi); others do not deny this but claim that such a series of causes is not self-explanatory (e.g. Leibniz).</p> <p>Objections to Aquinas’ first two ways, broadly the same argument, might regard the view of God as First Cause or Unmoved Mover either as a rather limited view of God – one that does not depict God as being worthy of worship – or as contradictory (nothing is the cause of itself, God is <i>causa sui</i>). Kant argues that we impose the idea of causation on events and both Hume and Russell argue that if we provide a causal explanation of each event there is no need to explain the series of events as a whole. At a quantum level, events may be indeterminate and uncaused.</p> <p>Similarly, Aquinas’ third way (contingency) seems to be flawed. The claim that ‘at some time nothing would exist’ does not follow from ‘every thing at some time does not exist’. Moreover, the idea of a necessary being – or necessary existence – is dubious. Again, both Hume and Kant argue that necessity does not apply to existence. We can deny an existential claim without contradiction. The debate between Father Copleston and Bertrand Russell – particularly Russell’s view that the universe is ‘a brute fact’ that does not require an explanation – is likely to be referenced.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
9	<p>Only the Kalam argument denies the possibility of an actual infinite temporal regress. Examples of why actual infinities are absurd (e.g. Hilbert's Hotel) may be given. The Kalam argument suggests that the universe did begin to exist in time. This has received support from scientific research suggesting that the 'Big Bang' occurred some 14 billion years ago. The argument here is that whatever begins to exist has a cause; the universe began to exist and, therefore, has a cause. However, whether the cause was God or some property of matter/energy remains an open question.</p> <p>The argument from Leibniz and Clarke is that every being is either dependent or self-existent; not every being can be dependent; therefore, there exists a self-existent being. The principle of sufficient reason, in Leibniz's words, claims that 'no fact can be real or existent...unless there is a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise'. A problem with this is that, as an explaining fact, the principle of sufficient reason entails the fact that it explains. Thus, the contingent fact becomes a necessary fact. This may have been acceptable to Leibniz, given that the world we inhabit is 'the best of all possible worlds'. However, Voltaire famously attacked the view that everything that happens is for the best in this, the best of all possible worlds. Moreover, it does not seem possible, or even likely, that every contingent fact has an explanation. Again, there is a difficulty, more than a difficulty, of proving that the self-existing being is the God of classical theism.</p> <p>Responses may reject all versions of the argument but still argue that some versions are stronger or less flawed than other versions. Alternatively, some candidates may argue that all versions of the argument, taken together with other arguments, experiences and commitments, strongly support religious belief.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
10(a)	<p>With reference to the passage, explain Jesus' use of parables as a form of teaching.</p> <p>Matthew 13 has a number of parables about the kingdom. The two parables in verses 31–33 both seem to have the same meaning – that there is a stark contrast between the small beginnings of the kingdom and the splendour of the final outcome. The birds of the air in verse 32 relate to the universality of the kingdom, which might have caused some surprise or even alarm to Jesus' listeners, suggesting that the parable's meaning, hidden within a parable, might have had some tactical advantage. The parable of the yeast uses a typical technique of Jesus: to take an ordinary (to his audience) experience and translate it into an unusual setting, drawing his audience in and providing effective and memorable teaching – or to use the familiar to provide access to heavenly concepts.</p> <p>Verse 34 suggests that parables were the sole method of Jesus' teaching, although Matthew itself contains direct teaching not in parables (e.g. the Sermon on the Mount). Verse 35 relates (in a typically Matthean way) the context to the fulfilment of Scripture: parables are to be used as a form of proclamation of that which has been hidden – the revelation of mysterious (or divine) truths which, by being revealed as parables, allow those who do not have the ability or willingness to understand them to miss the point.</p> <p>Answers might refer, earlier in the chapter, to verses 14ff. to illustrate this point further. Some might also suggest that this was a way of avoiding premature arrest – the single-minded authorities may have missed the radical nature of the teachings – and their significance, given they have been hidden since creation. Answers may note the absence of parables as a form of teaching in John.</p> <p>Some candidates might be aware of the dual sources to this passage – the Markan version sitting alongside the Q version. This could lead to the observation that Jesus' teachings entered the tradition and became distorted – or that Jesus may have used parables so typically that they were told more than once.</p> <p>The chapter proceeds to a private conversation with the disciples where he explains his teachings in more detail. Given the crowds may have been a mix of believers and non-believers, the use of parables may have been a means by which to differentiate between the two.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
10(b)	<p>‘The gospel teachings on the kingdom of God are totally clear.’ Critically evaluate this claim.</p> <p>The Synoptic Gospels place the preaching of the kingdom of God (‘kingdom of heaven’ in Matthew) at the heart of Jesus’ ministry – the first words of Jesus in Mk 1:15 set the tone for the Gospel. The unanimity within the Synoptic Gospels suggests a real clarity in their approaches and understandings of the kingdom.</p> <p>There is further clarity in the sense of urgency within the Gospels – that people need to repent, to believe – and arguably, all Jesus’ ministry was geared to those two aspects: all people need to return to the fold (e.g. Luke 15).</p> <p>The idea of God’s kingdom was an idea familiar in Jesus’ context – the Old Testament looks forward to the time when God’s rule is established. However, even in this context came disagreement, which candidates might see within the texts of the Gospels: does God’s rule get established through a series of moral decisions (e.g. the Sheep and the Goats) or through the overturning of current political powers?</p> <p>Arguments suggesting that the teachings are not clear are likely to focus on the timing of the coming of the kingdom. Jesus’ ministry over demons, for example, is cited as proof that the kingdom is present now (Matthew 12:28); Mark 9:1–2 suggests that the kingdom is imminent and teachings such as Matthew 25 suggest that the kingdom is to be found in the future, either after death or at the end of time.</p> <p>Some candidates might also explore the location of the kingdom: within a person (Luke 17:21), present and growing in the world (Matthew 13:31–32) or in heaven (Matthew 5:20). They might explore different understandings of how and why the texts reached their current form using source, form or redaction criticism methodology.</p> <p>Candidates are free to argue that the seemingly different approach in John’s Gospel might provide clarity or the opposite. Some suggest (e.g. Sanders and Mastin) that the Fourth Gospel has simply re-evaluated the simplicity of the Synoptic Gospels such that present and future are instead presented as temporal and eternal. Thus, some recognise a continuity in the Christian tradition and others a contradiction. Some might consider the work of J. P. Meier, for example, in rejecting the historicity of most of the parables in their argument.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
11	<p>Critically examine Jesus' relationship with the Zealots.</p> <p>The Zealots, at the time of Jesus, were a movement that wished to overthrow the Roman Empire by force. The group was significant enough to have been associated with a major cause of the Jewish Revolt of 66 CE. Some trends in scholarship reject the existence of the group at the time of Jesus and suggest they emerged later in the first century, although it is a valid reading to suggest that the term Zealot can refer to anyone from a collection of bandit groups, such as the Sicarii (from which Iscariot comes).</p> <p>Responses may begin by presenting the many arguments against any form of link between Jesus and the Zealots. His teachings seem to reject any form of aggression or violence – the Sermon on the Mount tells the Christian to hold back before any form of anger, for example, and the temptation where Jesus is shown the kingdoms of the world rejects any sort of enforced power. Jesus' entry into Jerusalem contrasts the crowds' expectation of a deliverer with the image of Jesus on a donkey. When challenged over giving taxes to Caesar (Luke 20), Jesus' reply rejects the assertion that any allegiance to Caesar is in opposition to allegiance to God. If Judas is to be identified as linked to the Zealots, his betrayal could be argued to indicate disillusionment with the direction of Jesus' work.</p> <p>However, arguments to suggest that there was a closer link to the Zealots than might be initially evident include the naming of one of his disciples, Simon, 'the zealot', the naming of James and John as 'Sons of Thunder' and Judas Iscariot's presence in the 12.</p> <p>If there was a feeling of unease at the political situation under Roman rule (as well as the additional problems caused by Herod), it is in this context that the Jesus movement grew up and the influence could not be avoided. It could be debated whether or not Jesus himself was affected or whether the subsequent tradition was.</p> <p>The placing of the story of the cleansing of the Temple in the Synoptic Gospels to be linked so closely to Jesus' crucifixion might suggest that when the time was right, Jesus took physical action. Indeed, John's removal of the passage to Chapter 2 might be part of the early church's attempt to distance itself from the Zealots, especially in the guise they took in the second half of the first century. Equally, of course, the mention of Jesus using a whip in the Fourth Gospel might heighten the idea of Jesus as a man of violence.</p> <p>Some candidates may show awareness of the portrayal of the early Christians in non-Christian sources, such as Tacitus, as a terrorist movement in some sense. If the evangelists have placed an element of spin on Jesus' relationship with the Zealots for understandable reasons, it could be argued that there is some truth to be found in analysing these non-Christian sources.</p> <p>Candidates may use the work of scholars such as Brandon, Hengel, Schweitzer and Aslan to illustrate their argument.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
12	<p>'In the gospels, the resurrection accounts have less significance than the crucifixion narratives.' Critically assess this claim.</p> <p>Candidates are free to approach this question by looking at the gospels in turn, by taking a more general approach or a combination of the two.</p> <p>Candidates may begin by observing that the passion narratives occupy a significantly greater amount of space than those of the resurrection and resurrection appearances, and some might observe that this is curious, given that the resurrection is that which gives true meaning to the crucifixion.</p> <p>The crucifixion of Jesus, however, holds theological significance in the context of the readership and Jewish background to Christianity. By suffering and dying, Jesus becomes the suffering servant spoken about in Isaiah and his sacrifice in Christian thought becomes a sacrifice on behalf of many (e.g. Mark 10:45).</p> <p>However, Jesus' preparation of his disciples is not just for his death but for his resurrection – the temple of his body being raised again (e.g. John 2:19). True understanding of Jesus' work as seen at the Transfiguration is not of his teachings or his death but of his glory. Glory is a recurring theme in the Fourth Gospel also.</p> <p>The resurrection accounts carefully show that Jesus actually died and then he was transformed into a heavenly body – he still ate, for example, but also passed through walls. Some might argue that the resurrection accounts are more significant but they tie in with the need for faith, as seen in the account of Thomas in John 20:24–29, which is why they are shorter. Others might argue that the resurrection is the beginning of a new era for Christians, as seen in Luke's continuation into a second volume, Acts.</p> <p>Candidates might suggest that the lack of consistencies in the resurrection accounts, against the essential agreement in the crucifixion narratives, poses questions for the historicity of the former. Mark's original ending at 16:8 suggests that the early church may not have seen as much significance in the resurrection, but later tradition added significance (e.g. the woman's fear in Mark being changed to joy in Matthew).</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	25